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AFTER ACQUIRING AN
AUDIENCE: A BRIEF REPLY TO
THE JUNE 2001 CRITIQUE
REGARDING AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE
GREGORY S. FISHER*
This Reply briefly answers a critique by Terry A. Venneberg of the author’s previous article addressing the use of
after-acquired evidence in employment cases in Alaska.
I was gratified to read the June 2001 critique1 of my article
analyzing the use of after-acquired evidence in employment cases
2
in Alaska, if only to confirm that someone, somewhere, actually
read my article (other than my mother). I was perhaps more
pleased that my analysis inspired others to publish. Good academic dialogue inspires, perhaps provokes, responses to which reCopyright © 2001 by Gregory S. Fisher. This Reply is also available on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/18ALRFisher.
* Law Clerk, Honorable John W. Sedwick of the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska; B.A., with honors, Binghamton University, 1988;
J.D., University of Washington School of Law, 1991. The author will commence a
term clerkship with the Honorable Barry G. Silverman, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in September 2002. The views expressed in this article, as well as any mistakes, are solely the author’s and do not represent the
views of any court or employer with whom the author has been associated.
1. Terry A. Venneberg, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Cases in
Alaska: An Alternative Approach, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 59 (2001).
2. Gregory S. Fisher, A Brief Analysis of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Cases: A Proposed Model for Alaska (and Points South), 17 ALASKA L.
REV. 271 (2000).
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plies are customarily granted. The editors of the Alaska Law Review have graciously permitted me this brief Reply to respond to
the critique’s analysis of after-acquired evidence.
The critique asserts that my analysis is inconsistent with
3
Alaska law without offering any support for this surprising contention. The critique implies that the principles set out in Brogdon v.
4
City of Klawock and McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
5
Co. answer all outstanding questions regarding the use of afteracquired evidence and that these cases “reflect the current state of
6
the law in Alaska,” thereby leaving the reader with the impression
that all relevant issues have been resolved. The critique announces
that it will offer an approach to the use of after-acquired evidence
7
in Alaska that negates the perceived deficiencies in my analysis.
Unfortunately, the critique never supports its central thesis and
fails to explain how my analysis is inconsistent with Alaska law or
how the critique’s recommendations represent an improvement.
Contrary to the critique’s suggestion, the Alaska Supreme
Court has not decided what effect, if any, after-acquired evidence
will have in employment litigation. With regard to the use of afteracquired evidence, two questions are of primary importance: (1)
what burden of proof should be placed on employers to establish
the existence of after-acquired evidence; and (2) once established,
what effect should after-acquired evidence have? That is, should
after-acquired evidence bar suit or merely limit available reme8
dies? There is no current state of the law in Alaska with respect to
these issues. In Brogdon v. City of Klawock, the court offered tentative thoughts in dicta indicating how it might, or might not, re9
solve these issues. The Brogdon court suggested that it “might be
appropriate to fashion a rule that no post-termination justification
should serve to limit damages unless it is one which all reasonable
employers would regard as mandating termination and which is, as
10
The court also
a matter of law, just cause for termination.”
opined that it might be appropriate to impose a heightened burden
of proof upon employers seeking to rely on after-acquired evi11
dence. Since then, the court has not revisited any issue related to
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Venneberg, supra note 1, at 60.
930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
513 U.S. 352 (1995).
Venneberg, supra note 1, at 60.
Id.
See Fisher, supra note 2, at 275-83 for further discussion.
Brogdon, 930 P.2d at 992.
Id.
Id.
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after-acquired evidence. Thus, the critique inaccurately implies
that all relevant issues have been resolved by Brogdon.
Identifying Brogdon as reflecting the current state of the law
in Alaska seems somewhat puzzling insofar as the supreme court
12
Of
essentially acknowledged that its comments were dicta.
course, dicta may possess predictive value, and thus may fore13
shadow precedent. There is no reason, however, to accept dicta
uncritically where—as I would argue with respect to the Brogdon
court’s analysis—it arises in a factual and legal vacuum and conflicts with the developing weight of authority. The Brogdon court’s
dicta arose in such a vacuum because the only issue confronted by
the court was whether after-acquired evidence could be relied upon
if it was evidence that would have been discovered had the termi14
nation not occurred. The court was never asked to consider what
burden of proof should apply or what effect after-acquired evidence should have once introduced. The trial court ruled that after-acquired evidence could not be relied upon unless it was evidence that would have been discovered had the termination not
15
occurred, and the supreme court reversed. No other issues pertaining to after-acquired evidence were properly before the court.
Indeed, the court emphasized that “the question whether a new
cause for termination merely serves to limit damages or eliminates
16
entirely the right to damages is not presented.” The court additionally stressed that “[w]e rule at this time only that the limitation
imposed by the trial court that evidence in support of new reasons
for termination must be such as would have been discovered had
17
termination not taken place was erroneous.” To read Brogdon as
holding anything beyond the issue it confronted would be contrary
18
to settled principles governing stare decisis and precedent.

12. Id.
13. See Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1952); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)
(implying that dicta may be relevant by stating that the law includes the “prophecies of what courts will do in fact”).
14. Brogdon, 930 P.2d at 992.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Although courts and commentators often speak of “holdings,” surprisingly
little attention is paid to what the Anglo-American legal community actually
means when it discusses holdings, stare decisis and precedent. Chief Judge Singleton succinctly states the basic concept as follows:
The holding of the case is the application of the law to the specific facts
before the court, while dicta involves expressions of opinion about the
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The Brogdon court’s dicta conflict with the developing weight
of authority because, as discussed in greater detail in my article, a
growing majority of courts now hold that after-acquired evidence
19
bars suit in common law actions and may be established by a pre20
ponderance of evidence (not a heightened burden of proof). Indeed, what I characterize as a growing majority has been described
as an overwhelming majority, at least to the extent that after21
acquired evidence operates to bar claims.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the Brogdon court’s
dicta is the extent to which it can be read to intrude upon private
contractual relationships. By stating that after-acquired evidence
should be limited to situations where “all reasonable employers
would regard [the employee’s misconduct] as mandating termina22
tion and which is, as a matter of law, just cause for termination,”
the court suggested a rule that undermines the right of private employers and employees to define the terms and conditions of employment relationships. The full theoretical import of this rule has
not been analyzed, but one wonders why it would not impair con23
tractual obligations, or operate to take property rights associated
24
with contract powers vested in private parties. Leaving these issues aside, it seems questionable to establish a rule increasing court
supervision of employment matters in derogation of the courts’
general reluctance to intrude upon employers’ management discre25
tion. In light of these considerations, the Brogdon court’s dicta
should carry little persuasive weight. The critique’s reliance on
Brogdon is, I argue, therefore misguided.
way the law would be applied to facts not before the court. The Ninth
Circuit does not consider itself bound by dicta in earlier cases.
United States v. Reed, 810 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 n.3 (D. Alaska 1992) (citations
omitted).
19. See O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795 (Ariz.
1998); Crawford Rehab. Serv., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 547-48 (Colo.
1997); Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 933 P.2d
743, 745-46 (Kan. 1997); Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 444-45 (S.C.
1998); see also Fisher, supra note 2, at 272 n.2.
20. See O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th
Cir. 1996); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 616 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984); Preston v.
Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Co., 647 A.2d 364, 368-69 (Conn. 1994).
21. O’Day, 959 P.2d at 795.
22. Brogdon, 930 P.2d at 992.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. See, e.g., Holland v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 993 P.2d 1026, 1035-36 (Alaska
1999); Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149, 153 (Alaska 1995).
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The critique strays further afield by relying heavily on
McKennon and Brogdon to provide answers for analyzing after26
acquired evidence in common law employment actions. It fails to
study McKennon’s facts and holding and inexplicably ignores existing precedent concluding that McKennon’s holding has no place
27
in common law employment actions. McKennon analyzed after28
acquired evidence in the context of civil rights claims. The Court
did not—indeed could not consistent with Article III powers—announce a general rule applying to all employment claims. Even in
the context of civil rights claims, McKennon presented somewhat
unusual facts: the employment relationship was undeniably established, and the employer conceded that it had impermissibly dis29
criminated against the employee. How many employers walk into
court asking the judge to assume for purposes of a pending motion
that a plaintiff-employee’s civil rights were violated by unlawful
discrimination? After-acquired evidence is often based on résumé
or job application fraud, and therefore calls into question whether
30
a valid employment relationship was ever established. Moreover,
employers do not often admit to discriminating impermissibly
against an employee. Thus, the peculiar facts and circumstances
that the Court faced in McKennon produced a rule that, in the specific context of remedial civil rights statutes, seems fair and fairly
applied.
Even under the unique facts and special legal context of
McKennon, the Court still did not announce a universal rule entitling plaintiffs to back pay damages in all cases. Instead, the Court
emphasized that its model was a “beginning point” which could be
modified by “extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
31
legitimate interests of either party.” Outside the context of remedial civil rights statutes—or even in that context facing different
26. See Venneberg, supra note 1, at 64-66.
27. See, e.g., O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795
(Ariz. 1998); Crawford Rehab. Serv., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 547-48
(Colo. 1997); Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 933
P.2d 743, 745-46 (Kan. 1997); Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d at 444-45 (S.C.
1998).
28. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354, 356 (1995)
(analyzing after-acquired evidence in an age discrimination claim).
29. Id. at 359-60.
30. See William D. Fisher, Employment Law: McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. and After-Acquired Evidence—A Convincing Resolution to Employer/Employee Misconduct or an Incomplete Assessment of the Issue?, 50 OKLA.
L. REV. 135, 146 (1997) (citing and discussing studies and cases of preemployment fraud). I should perhaps clarify that I am not related to Mr. Fisher.
31. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
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facts—McKennon’s holding is less persuasive.32 Indeed, persuasive
33
arguments exist that McKennon’s rule is counter-productive.
Recognizing that McKennon’s holding was affected by its unique
facts in the context of a remedial civil rights statute, most courts
conclude that McKennon’s holding should not be extended to
34
common law employment actions.
Thus, the critique adopts minority views without frankly conceding that point. The critique argues that courts should adopt
McKennon’s rule for common law employment cases, declaring
with no helpful analysis that “[t]he approach outlined in McKennon should be applied to all cases where the employer seeks to in35
voke the after-acquired evidence rule.” The critique also recommends that courts adopt a “clear and convincing” burden of proof
36
There is
to govern admissibility of after-acquired evidence.
nothing inherently flawed in advocating minority positions. Indeed, some of the most important rules governing our society began as minority views. Furthermore, consistent with concepts related to federalism, one could argue that the law’s development is
best served by dynamic state court activity testing the limits of legal
principles, an exercise necessarily dependent upon some state
courts adopting minority positions. However, to maintain academic integrity, such positions should be identified and explained.
The critique implies that its reasoning accords with the majority
view by failing frankly to acknowledge that it espouses minority
views. By implying that McKennon is the seminal case on the use
37
of after-acquired evidence, it suggests that McKennon’s holding
has equal analytical force and effect when applied to all employ38
ment cases. It does not. By implying that its conclusions fit comfortably within the majority rule, the critique leaves the reader with
a misleading and inaccurate picture of the law.
The critique also relies on the unsubstantiated premise that
employers will abuse after-acquired evidence. In fact, it goes so far

32. W. Fisher, supra note 30, at 148-52.
33. See Jenny B. Wahl, Protecting the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Perverse Consequences of the McKennon Rule, 32 AKRON L. REV. 577, 596-602 (1999).
34. See, e.g., O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795
(Ariz. 1998); Crawford Rehab. Serv., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 547-59
(Colo. 1997); Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 933
P.2d 743, 745 (Kan. 1997); Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d at 444-45 (S.C.
1998); see also W. Fisher, supra note 30, at 148.
35. Venneberg, supra note 1, at 64-65.
36. Id. at 66-67.
37. See id. at 64-65.
38. See id. at 69.
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as to suggest that it would be naive to conclude otherwise.39 The
problem with the critique’s argument is that there is no evidence
for this premise. Unsubstantiated premises offer questionable support. Unsubstantiated premises wielded by advocates are even
more problematic. In this respect, the critique suffers from three
flaws. First, the critique fails to account for the need to strike a
delicate balance so as to protect both employees’ and employers’
interests. Second, the critique fails to explain why courts permit
employers to rebut prima facie civil rights claims by less than a
preponderance of evidence if, as assumed by the critique, employ40
ers routinely abuse employees’ rights. One would intuit a contrary rule if the critique’s premise enjoyed a rational foundation.
Third, the critique’s premise opens a Pandora’s Box of irrational
assumptions that sweep away all pretense of reasoned analysis.
One wonders why the critique stopped where it did. Indeed, why
not dispense with any burden of proof, skip the trial, and jump
straight to awarding the employee damages based on the premise
that all employers wrongfully fire employees?
The “premise game” cuts both ways. Adopting the critique’s
reasoning would free courts to dismiss employees’ claims based on
the premise that employees materially misrepresent their qualifications on job applications, a premise that is at least supported by ac41
tual studies, unlike the critique’s premise. When the Alaska Supreme Court confronts the issue of after-acquired evidence, it will
adopt the rule of law that it believes is most consistent with reason,
policy and precedent. Reason implies reasonableness. It may or
may not be naive to reject the premise that all employers act with
ill motives and will abuse after-acquired evidence, but I believe it is
imprudent to accept the broad implications of that premise in the
absence of any competent evidence or study supporting it.
Finally, like the point expressly stated in my article, the critique’s assessment of after-acquired evidence of post-termination
42
For reasons admisconduct accords with the majority view.
dressed in the article, however, I believe that evidence of posttermination misconduct should be relevant and admissible for
damages and that courts should study this issue more carefully.
For example, I do not believe that a child day care center should
39. See id. at 64.
40. Fisher, supra note 2, at 292.
41. W. Fisher, supra note 30, at 146 (discussing studies of pre-employment
fraud).
42. Fisher, supra note 2, at 295 (“The few courts examining post-termination
evidence of misconduct have held, under the particular circumstances presented,
that such evidence should be excluded.”).
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have to reinstate an employee if it is discovered that, after the employee was terminated, he was convicted of trafficking in child pornography, or that a trucking firm should be required to reinstate a
driver if it is discovered that, after the driver was terminated, she
was convicted of multiple driving-related offenses. The critique
adopts a contrary position based on its core premise that employers
will abuse the rule. Because I do not find the critique’s core premise especially helpful or persuasive, I am not able to reach the same
conclusions. Ironically, my analysis is consistent with the McKennon Court’s conclusion that its model was a “beginning point,”
which could be modified by “extraordinary equitable circumstances
43
that affect the legitimate interests of either party.”
One last observation is warranted. I do not believe we can
fairly state that there is a “current state of the law” with respect to
how after-acquired evidence is applied in employment cases. A
careful reader will quickly realize that courts have adopted a variety of views that overlap in some respects and conflict in others.
While it is possible to identify significant trends, it may not be possible or advisable to conclude that one model answers all problems
or is air-tight in its analysis. Indeed, I frankly acknowledged in my
article that my analysis “is not without its own flaws, and it does
44
not address all of the implications of after-acquired evidence.”
However, I maintain that my analysis “parallels existing Alaska law
and thus offers uniform guidance with which the bench and bar are
45
already familiar.” Until the Alaska Supreme Court provides us
with more direct instruction, I do not believe we can or should presume to accomplish much more than that.
Knowing how much time and effort is involved in submitting
an article for publication, I am honored that my article inspired a
response. This Reply has attempted to clarify issues regarding after-acquired evidence in light of that response. I believe that my
article and the critique competently survey the more significant issues. No brief study could do much more. If our collective efforts
assist the Alaska Supreme Court, or any other court, in analyzing
after-acquired evidence in employment cases, then we will have
served the bench and bar. If not, we have at least provided our respective mothers with appropriate coffee table coasters.

43. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
44. Fisher, supra note 2, at 296.
45. Id.

